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Abstract 
Agricultural production is becoming more like manufacturing in the routinization of 
processes, the extent to which raw materials are processed, capital intensity, and its 
emphasis on throughput. Some ascribe the changes to demand-side factors while others 
look to technological innovations. Emphasizing cost seasonality as a reference indicator 
for nature’s role in agricultural production, this paper develops a simple model that 
includes both supply and demand sides. We show how cost seasonality can impede 
product development to meet consumer needs and find that there may be a ceiling level 
of cost seasonality below which a non-seasonal equilibrium production profile occurs. 
Price seasonality is decreasing in cost seasonality. An increase in demand for more-
processed products induces a shift toward non-seasonal production. Regions with 
strongly seasonal cost advantages will produce lower-value products while less-seasonal 
regions will produce higher-value products. If a region with high-cost seasonality has a 
non-seasonal cost disadvantage, then an increase in demand for processing can reduce the 
region’s competitiveness. 
 
Keywords: industrialization, lifestyle changes, regional production systems, value added. 
 
JEL classification: D2, L2, N5, Q1
  
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, COST SEASONALITY, REGION 
MARGINALIZATION, AND A MORE DEMANDING CONSUMER 
Introduction 
Agriculture, and particularly produce from smaller livestock species, has undergone 
striking changes since 1930 in the higher-income economies. Drabenstott (1994), Boehlje 
(1996), Blayney (2002), Key and McBride (2003), and others have commented upon 
many of these changes. Animals are being grown indoors, in a more controlled environ-
ment, and with less human intervention. Geographic production shares have changed, 
scale is larger, throughput is more intense, more attention is being paid to quality, and 
downstream involvement is more pervasive. The provocative phrases “factory farming” 
and “industrialized agriculture” have merit as descriptors of the resulting approach to 
production.  
Confinement, genetics, and mechanization are widely regarded as being important in 
these changes. Less obvious are the drivers of these changes. Some see exogenous events 
on the demand side as being important for change at the farm (Senauer, Asp, and Kinsey 
1991; Barkema 1993) and processing (Connor and Schiek 1997) levels. Official govern-
ment demographic statistics and other survey statistics suggest that more families in high-
income countries are time-stressed and are using higher incomes to purchase conven-
ience, information, and differentiation as well as calories when buying food.  
On the other hand, it is difficult to ignore supply-side issues, including innovations in 
biotechnology that facilitate control, and other technologies that substitute for labor. An 
important contribution to the literature is by Allen and Lueck (2002), who suggest that 
traditional, smaller-scale family farms are effective institutions in much of crop agricul-
ture. The reason is that an owner-operator has stronger incentives than do employees to 
cope with the managerial decisions that arise when nature presents a steady flow of fresh 
decision contexts. Technologies that promote control and uniformity should reduce the 
extent of this advantage relative to the benefits of scale economies. Hennessy, 
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Miranowski, and Babcock (2004) suggest that control technologies should also promote 
product development and accelerate the rate of innovation. Enhancing control often in-
volves reducing the role of nature in production. Erdogdu (2002) and also Roosen, 
Hennessy, and Hennessy (2004) show that seasonal variability in animal production (par-
ticularly hogs and milk) is receding. The latter work suggests that the phenomenon is 
intimately connected with the incentive to avoid idling capital stock. 
Identifying the cause(s) of changes is not necessarily straightforward. For example, 
more food processing may be occurring because more is known about manipulating food as 
a result of innovations in genetics and allied technologies. Agriculture receives many of 
these technologies primarily as benefits from public sector research and from medical sec-
tor spillovers. Then the advent of more food processing would be due in part to exogenous 
factors on the supply side rather than to increased demand for processing. So just observing 
change is insufficient evidence to ascribe cause. If the argument that exogenous changes on 
the demand side are driving observed behavior toward the supply end is to merit serious 
empirical scrutiny, then one must ask what the mechanism might be. 
Focusing on the well-established supply-side phenomenon of deseasonalization in 
production (Tomek and Robinson 2003; Hayenga et al. 1985), this paper studies relation-
ships between consumer preferences, processing activities, and production seasonality. 
Hennessy and Roosen (2003), and Roosen, Hennessy, and Hennessy (2004) have investi-
gated equilibrium farm-level production seasonality but have not addressed how 
processing might interact with consumer preferences and equilibrium production season-
ality. To the best of our knowledge, no formal economic literature exists on explaining 
any such relationships.  
The issue is important because a frequently mentioned constraint on development in 
poorer countries is the difficulty in supporting food processing when supply is strongly 
seasonal (Hicks 2004; Lambert 2001; Dobson 2003). And this constraint is not limited to 
low-income countries. Under-utilization of milk processing plants because of seasonality 
is an important problem in Ireland and in New Zealand, as described in a report by Pro-
mar International (2003). That report, commissioned by the Irish government, also 
identifies the dairy industries in Ireland and New Zealand as being less successful than 
are those in Denmark and the Netherlands in penetrating markets for more extensively 
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processed milk products. Processing was confined largely to lower-margin products that 
store well, such as butter, skim milk powder, and whole milk powder. 
The general issue is also important because governments throughout the world, in-
cluding at the U.S. state and federal levels, allocate funds to promote food sector value-
adding activities. For example, the 2002 U.S. farm bill provided for value-added producer 
grants. In 2004, $13.2 million was made available in this way. But if the money is to be 
spent effectively for a particular region, there should be some understanding of roles for 
regional attributes in incentives to add value. There does not appear to be an economics 
literature on this theme. 
In this paper we connect exogenous changes in consumer preferences to the phe-
nomenon of agricultural industrialization. We do so by developing a model to show that 
the level of processing should be inversely related to a region’s seasonal cost advantages. 
The reason is that capital is required for processing and some of this capital will remain 
idle for some of the year whenever throughput is seasonal. For the same reason, growing 
demand for further processing can induce non-seasonal production even when cost ad-
vantages to seasonal production remain. Oddly, we conclude that farmgate price 
seasonality should decrease with an increase in cost seasonality. The reason has to do 
with the incentive to process. It is shown that less cost seasonal production regions that 
are marginally competitive should produce higher-value products. In addition, increased 
demand for higher-value products should immiserize the more cost seasonal of two pro-
duction regions because the act of processing dulls comparative advantage. 
 
Model and Supply Side 
An industry producing in a two-season year faces seasonal costs at c + δ  per unit 
output of raw materials in season A and c − δ  in season B, where 0c > , 0δ ≥ , and 
c > δ . Quantity δ  is referred to as the cost seasonality parameter. Output share (of total 
annual output) in high-cost season A is 0.5 z− , with residual 0.5 z+  produced in low-
cost season B. Variable z , referred to as the production seasonality variable, is endoge-
nous to the model. The industry also faces farm-level non-seasonal quadratic costs that 
depend on the share of production in a particular season.  
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These costs amount to 20.5 ( ) , 0, { , }is i A Bγ γ > ∈ , where 0.5As z= −  in season A and 
Bs =  0.5 z+  in season B. Our cost specification is scale-neutral in the sense that the per 
year cost of producing amount 1Q  with share As  in season A is 1 2/Q Q  times the cost of 
producing 2Q  with the same share As  in season A. The specification is a particular case 
of that in Hennessy and Roosen (2003), where the effects of policy variables on seasonal 
prices and production were considered. Share dispersion across seasons increases farm-
level costs because the incentive to invest in use-specific skills and resources declines 
while adjustment costs are incurred when resources are temporarily redeployed. 
The raw materials coming from farms can be transformed into processed product and 
the industry must choose the extent of processing. Produce leaving farms is either perish-
able or storage over seasons is prohibitively expensive, so that farm production in season 
{ , }i A B∈  is processed in that season. If processing to level 0n >  occurs, then industry 
revenue amounts to 20 10.5n nα − α  per unit output, where 0 0α >  and 1 0α > . A quadratic 
revenue specification is chosen to preserve a (largely) linear model structure and so pro-
vide a simple working model that facilitates insights. 
Processing requires capital, and the annual cost of capital for processing to level n  is 
nF  per unit of peak-load output, where 0F ≥  is the annual cost of capital per unit of 
processing engaged in. Processed product, as in tinned produce or skim milk powder, is 
assumed to be readily storable across seasons and we ignore storage costs in processed 
food markets. Since 0δ ≥ , it will readily be shown that peak-load is in season B with 
production share 0.5 z+ . Thus, annual capital costs are (0.5 )nF z+ . This peak-load capi-
tal cost set-up is consistent with that in Roosen, Hennessy, and Hennessy (2004) except 
that the cost depends on the level of processing, n , our main variable of interest. Contri-
butions in Tamime and Law 2001 indicate the present extent of mechanization and 
automation in milk processing and the trend toward more capitalization in processing.  
The industry is perfectly competitive, so that industry choices of n  and z  are consis-
tent with the maximization problem  
 
2
, , 0 1
2 2
max ( , ) max 0.5 ( )(0.5 ) ( )(0.5 )
0.5 (0.5 ) 0.5 (0.5 ) (0.5 ).
n z n zV n z n n c z c z
z z nF z
= α − α − + δ − − − δ +
− γ − − γ + − +  (1) 
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The objective function is clearly concave in n  and z  whenever 212 0F∆ ≡ γα − > . Con-
cavity is violated for F  that is sufficiently large, but ( , )V n z  is never convex in its 
arguments. We assume throughout that 0∆ > . The first-order conditions for interior solu-
tions establish 
 
2
* *1 0 02 0.5 2 2; .F F F Fz nδα − α + γα − γ − δ= =∆ ∆  (2) 
Both argument values are strictly positive (i.e., interior) when the value of 0F ≥  is suffi-
ciently small. Observe that *z  and *n  are not linear in the value of F . This non-linearity 
arises from the fact that capital must meet peak-load needs, as reflected in the capital cost 
(0.5 )nF z+ . 
It must be that * 0n >  because otherwise non-positive revenue would attend positive 
costs. Therefore, 02 /( 2 )F < γα γ + δ . Notice also that *z  is bounded from below by 0 be-
cause * 0z <  would imply high production in the higher-cost season and there are no 
countervailing motives in the model. Setting its value at the lower bound, * 0z = , we 
have 0 1( 0.5 ) /(2 )F Fδ = α − α  as the set of parameters in ( , )F δ  space such that 
*( , ) 0z F δ = . In addition, 21 0 1( ) /(2 )F Fδ = γα + α − α  is the parameter indifference curve 
along which * 0.5z = .  
 
RESULT 1. Let 0 1min 2 /( 2 ), 2 F γα γ + δ γα >  . Then competitive equilibrium seasonal-
ity in the production of raw materials is  
(a) null (i.e., * 0z = ) if 0 1( 0.5 ) /(2 )F Fδ ≤ α − α . In that case, * 0 1( 0.5 ) /n F= α − α .  
(b) completely seasonal ( * 0.5z = ) if 21 0 1( ) /(2 )F Fδ ≥ γα + α − α . In that case, 
*
0 1( ) /n F= α − α .  
 
Notice that 2 21 0 0 0.5F F F Fγα + α − > α −  whenever 0∆ > , which is assumed in Re-
sult 1. So the intervals defined in parts (a) and (b) of Result 1 do not overlap. For the 
second statement in each of parts (a) and (b), optimize equation (1) conditional first on 
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0z =  and then on 0.5z = . To confirm the role of capital used in processing for equilib-
rium, set 0F = . 
 
COROLLARY 1. Production seasonality is never null ( * 0z > ) when 0F =  and 0δ > . Pro-
duction is completely seasonal when 0F =  and 0.5δ ≥ γ .  
 
EXAMPLE 1. If 0 10α = , 1 1α = , and 1γ = , then 0 1min 2 /( 2 ), 2 γα γ + δ γα =   
min 20 /(1 2 ), 2 + δ  . The result’s part (a) requires that 2 (10 0.5 )F Fδ ≤ − . If 1F = , 
then 0 1min 2 /( 2 ), 2 F γα γ + δ γα >   and 2 (10 0.5 )F Fδ ≤ −  whenever 4.75δ ≤ . Then 
there is null seasonality. On the other hand, 21 0 1( ) /(2 ) 5F Fγα + α − α =  while 
min 20 /(1 2 ), 2 1 + δ >   whenever 9.5 > δ . So [5,9.5)δ∈  ensures complete seasonality. 
Suppose that 0 10α = , 1 1α = , and 1F = , as before, but 5γ =  instead. Then 
0 1min 2 /( 2 ), 2 F γα γ + δ γα >   if 47.5 > δ , while 0 1( 0.5 ) /(2 )F Fδ ≤ α − α  if 4.75δ ≤  
so that null seasonality applies whenever 4.75δ ≤ . On the other hand, 
2
1 0 1( ) /(2 ) 7F Fγα + α − α =  so that partial seasonality occurs whenever (4.75,7)δ∈  and 
complete seasonality occurs whenever [7,47.5)δ∈ . As Corollary 1 suggests, a larger 
value for convexity parameter γ  ensures a wider range of circumstances under which 
partial seasonality can occur. 
 
Part (a) in Result 1 indicates how peak-load fixed costs can require complete sup-
pression of production seasonality in order to make best use of processing capital. When 
the value of F  is sufficiently low relative to the cost seasonality parameter, then it will 
always be optimal not to take advantage of cost seasonality. This might be the case in 
modern, large-scale hog production and dairying. In contrast, when the value of the cost 
seasonality parameter breaches a larger threshold then it is best to concentrate production 
in one season. This scenario is more relevant for crop production. We turn now to the 
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case where 2 21 1 02 0.5F F Fγα > α δ + − α > , i.e., interior solutions. From equation (2), we 
have the following. 
 
RESULT 2. Let 0 1min 2 /( 2 ), 2 F γα γ + δ γα >  . For interior competitive equilibrium sea-
sonality in the production of raw materials, production seasonality increases with cost 
seasonality ( * / 0dz dδ ≥ ) and the extent of processing decreases with cost seasonality 
( * / 0dn dδ ≤ ).  
 
While neither of these comparative statics should be at all surprising, they do provide 
a clear microeconomic justification for concerns among agribusiness analysts that high 
farm-level cost seasonality impedes processing. We turn now toward developing an un-
derstanding of the roles of capital and product development in determining the pricing of 
raw materials. The industry is competitive, so prices for raw materials at the farmgate 
will be set at marginal costs. Write Ap  and Bp  as the respective season A and season B 
farmgate prices that support these output shares. Now for an interior solution, season A 
cost is 2( ) 0.5 ( )A Ac s s+ δ + γ  so that season A marginal cost per unit of annual output is 
0.5Ac s c z+ δ + γ = + δ + γ − γ .1 Likewise, season B marginal cost is 0.5c z− δ + γ + γ .  
Substitute in from equation (2) at the optimum to obtain the equilibrium inter-season 
price spread as 
 
2 2
*02 2 .A B
F F Fp p n Fγα − γ − δ− = =∆  (3) 
But Result 2 assures that * / 0dn dδ ≤ . 
 
RESULT 3. Let competitive equilibrium seasonality in the production of raw materials be 
interior. The inter-season price spread is decreasing in the extent of cost seasonality.  
 
Price dispersion diminishes with an increase in δ  because larger cost seasonality en-
courages more production seasonality. This is not helpful in facilitating throughput and 
capital use efficiency for any processor. In response, processors will reduce the extent of 
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processing. This allows for a narrowing of the inter-season price spread because there is 
less exposure to the inefficient utilization problem.  
 
Demand Side 
With industry revenue as 20 10.5n nα − α , the marginal value of an increase in the ex-
tent of product development is 0 1nα −α . An increase in that marginal value may be 
represented by an increase in the value of 0α . Consumers seeking more processed foods 
may be viewed as having a larger value of 0α . Now considering interior solutions, we 
have from equation (2), * 0/ 2 /dn dα = γ ∆ >  0  and * 0/ / 0dz d Fα = − ∆ < . In addition, 
equation (3) conveys that 0( ) / 2 / 0A Bd p p d F− α = γ ∆ > . Notice too from equation (2) 
that *z  has value 0 whenever 20 1(2 0.5 ) /F Fα ≥ δα +  and value 0.5 whenever 
2
0 1[(2 ) ] /F Fα ≤ δ − γ α + .  
 
RESULT 4. Let 0 1min 2 /( 2 ), 2 F γα γ + δ γα >  . Then  
(a)  production seasonality is null if 20 1(2 0.5 ) /F Fα ≥ δα + , and complete if 0α ≤  
2
1[(2 ) ] /F Fδ − γ α − . 
For * (0,0.5)z ∈ ,  
(b)  the inter-season price spread is increasing in the demand for product development; 
and 
(c)  production seasonality is decreasing in the demand for product development.  
 
Part (c) conveys the idea that processors need to dampen production seasonality 
when growing demand for product development involves larger capital outlays on the 
part of processors. Eventually higher demand for product development will require a non-
seasonal supply base; see part (a). Procuring a less-seasonal supply base will involve 
widening the inter-season price spread, the content of part (b). Part (b) bears considera-
tion with Result 3. Suppose, as may well be the case, that technological innovations are 
biased over time toward cost deseasonalization and also that growing income has in-
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creased demand for product development. Then the net effect on the temporal trend in the 
inter-season price spread is to widen it. However, when production is under a contract 
with specified delivery schedules then inter-season price spreads should not have incen-
tive effects. 
 
Regional Systems and Changing Demand 
To be clearer about the role that a change in demand could have on the organization 
of production, in this section we will modify the demand structure to be more flexible. 
Let there be two levels of product development, 1n =  and 2n = . Households are willing 
to pay 1T  for the less-developed product and 2 1T T= +µ , 0µ > , for the more-developed 
product. The number of households is fixed at Q . Each household demands one unit of 
the good in total because the good is a necessity. There are also two production regions. 
Region N  has cost seasonality Nδ  while region S  has cost seasonality S Nδ < δ . Region 
N  ( S ) has the capacity to produce NQ  ( SQ ). 
Region N 
If the region chooses {1,2}n∈ , then the cost per unit of annual output is given by the 
solution to 
 
2 2
min ( )(0.5 )
( )(0.5 ) 0.5 (0.5 ) 0.5 (0.5 ) (0.5 ).
z N
N
c z
c z z z nF z
+ δ −
+ − δ + + γ − + γ + + +  (4) 
The first-order condition is  
 *, 2 ,
2
n N
N
nFz δ −= γ  (5) 
so that cost for an interior solution is  
 
2 2 2 20.25 0.25 0.5 ,n N NN
n F nF nFC c γ − δ − + γ + δ= + γ  (6) 
with *,/ 0.5 0n nN NdC dn F z F= + ≥  by equation (5). If prices for products n , nP , satisfy  
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 2 1
(0.5 0.75 ) ,N F FP P γ + δ −− > γ  (7) 
then region N  will produce the 2n =  good.  
Region S 
From equations (6) and (7), if 2 1 (0.5 0.75 ) /SP P F F− > γ + δ − γ , then region S  will 
produce the 2n =  product. Clearly, S Nδ < δ  ensures that region S  is the more likely to 
produce the 2n =  product. Using equation (5), the difference between region costs is  
 *, *,( )( ) ( )( ) 0.n n n nN SN S N S S N N S
nFC C z z− δ − δ− = δ − δ = δ − δ + ≤γ  (8) 
Thus, at either n  value, region N  is the more competitive. This is because the only cost 
difference between regions is given by parameter comparison S Nδ < δ , and N  can better 
tailor production to avail of the costs in its low-cost season. But [ ] /n nN Sd C C dn− =  
( ) / 0N S Fδ − δ γ ≥ , so that the region’s comparative advantage decreases at higher levels 
of product development. Its comparative advantage disappears entirely whenever both 
regions find non-seasonal production to be efficient.  
Supply Meets Demand 
We require that [ ]max ,N S N SQ Q Q Q Q+ > > , so that capacity will be slack in one or 
the other region. Since the good is a necessity, 1 11 max ,N ST C C >   . There are three possible 
situations,  
(1)  2 1N NC Cµ ≥ − : In this case, 2 1S SC Cµ > −  and both regions produce the 2n =  product. 
Since S  must be the marginal producer, 2 22 S NP C C= > . Surplus of N  is 
2 2( ) 0S N NC C Q− > , while that of S  is 0. 
(2)  2 1 2 1N N S SC C C C− > µ ≥ − : In this case, S  produces the 2n =  product but N  produces 
the 1n =  product. Competition ensures that 1 21 2N NP C P C− ≥ −  and 2 12 1S SP C P C− ≥ − , 
that is, 2 1N NC C− ≥  2 12 1 S SP P C C− ≥ − . But [ ]max ,N S N SQ Q Q Q Q+ > >  means there 
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is surplus supply and it must come from S  because that region has a higher cost for 
either product. And so 22 SP C= , meaning that 1 2 21 N S NP C C C− ≥ −  so that surplus of 
N  is 1 2 21( ) ( ) 0N N S N NP C Q C C Q− ≥ − > , while that of S  is 0. Relative to case (1), sur-
plus of N  is larger while that of S  is the same. 
(3)  2 1S SC C− > µ : In this case, both regions produce the 1n =  product. Price is 11 SP C= , 
so that surplus of N  is 1 1( )S N NC C Q− . To compare with case (2), there 
2 1
2 1 S SP P C C− ≥ −  while 22 SP C=  so that 1 1SC P≥  and 1 1( )S N NC C Q−  is an upper bound 
on surplus of N  in case (2).  
Summarizing, we have the following. 
 
RESULT 5. Under the specified conditions, region S  produces the higher-value product in 
cases (1) and (2), while N  produces that product in case (1) only. Surplus of region N  is 
strictly positive. It decreases as preferences for the higher-value version of the necessity 
increases from 2 1S SC C− >  µ  through 2 1 2 1N N S SC C C C− > µ ≥ −  to 2 1N NC Cµ ≥ − . In all cases, 
region S  has zero surplus. 
Non-seasonal Cost Advantage to Region S 
To conclude we will model a slightly different scenario. Region N  continues to 
have a seasonal cost advantage due to S Nδ < δ  and (8). But region S  has a non-seasonal 
cost advantage in the sense that cost per unit over the year is 1 1ˆS SC C= −ρ  for 1n =  and 
2 2ˆ
S SC C= −ρ  for 2n =  where 0ρ > . This unit cost advantage may be due to lower en-
ergy, labor, land, or environmental compliance costs. The three cases are now as follows. 
(1) 2 1N NC Cµ ≥ − : As before, 2 1 2 1ˆ ˆS S S SC C C Cµ > − = −  and both regions produce the 2n =  
product. 
The case has two possible situations, 
 (i) 2 2S NC C− ≤ ρ : Then N  is the marginal producer and 2 22 N SP C C= ≥ −ρ . Surplus 
to S  is 2 2( ) 0N S SC C Q− +ρ ≥ , while that to N  is 0.  
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 (ii) 2 2S NC C− > ρ : Then S  is the marginal producer and 2 22 S NP C C= −ρ > . Surplus to 
N  is 2 2( ) 0S N NC C Q−ρ − > , while that to S  is 0. 
(2)  2 1 2 1ˆ ˆN N S SC C C C− > µ ≥ − : In this case, S  produces the 2n =  product but N  produces 
the 1n =  product. Again, there are two possible situations: 
 (i) 2 1S NC C− ≤ µ +ρ : Then N  is the marginal producer and 11 NP C= . Surplus to S  
is 1 2( ) 0N S SC C Q− +µ +ρ ≥ , while that to N  is 0.  
 (ii) 2 1S NC C− > µ +ρ : Then S  is the marginal producer and 22 SP C= −ρ . Surplus to 
N  is 2 1( ) 0S N NC C Q− −µ −ρ > .  
(3) 2 1ˆ ˆS SC C− > µ : In this case, both regions produce the 1n =  product. The two possibilities: 
 (i) 1 1S NC C− ≤ ρ : Then N  is the marginal producer and 1 11 N SP C C= ≥ −ρ . Surplus 
to S  is 1 1( ) 0N S SC C Q− +ρ ≥ , while that to N  is 0.  
 (ii) 1 1S NC C− > ρ : Then S  is the marginal producer and 1 11 S NP C C= −ρ > . Surplus to 
N  is 1 1( ) 0S N NC C Q−ρ − > , while that to S  is 0. 
This case-by-case information supports the following. 
 
RESULT 6. An increase in the value of µ  always reduces surplus to region N  and may 
leave that region as the marginal producer with zero economic surplus. 
 
A proof is provided in the Appendix. Region S, on the other hand, can only gain from 
strengthened demand for the more processed good. Notice that the region N production 
share decreases with µ . Blayney (2002) reports a decline in the traditional dairy region 
shares of U.S. milk production over 1975-2000.2 The result is interesting because it identi-
fies a context in which a region that has traditionally been very competitive as a production 
center becomes marginalized only because of how events on the demand side interact with 
the processing technology. Gains from taking advantage of seasonal cost efficiencies de-
cline as demand for processing increases and other cost issues become more critical. 
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Conclusion 
The intent of this paper has been to understand better how agricultural production sys-
tems interact with changing consumer demands. We chose one feature of the grower’s 
decision environment that differentiates production systems: seasonality in cost. We 
showed that capital fixities in processing can make it efficient for a cost-seasonal produc-
tion region to produce non-seasonally. Our model provides support for the opinions of 
many commentators that cost seasonality can impede the production of higher-value prod-
ucts. The inter-season price spread should decrease with the extent of cost seasonality but 
should increase with demand for product development. We also describe a scenario in 
which a traditionally profitable production region becomes marginal when demand for a 
more processed version of the commodity grows. This is because processing inadvertently 
erodes the traditional region’s competitive advantage. We believe that these findings should 
be testable as hypotheses regarding the evolution of livestock markets.  
Our model has not considered how demand-side seasonality could affect incentives 
to process. Demand-side seasonality is important for festive and religious food markets 
(e.g., Easter lamb). Over the past thirty years, production seasonality in the U.S. turkey 
sector has declined markedly, in large part because of industry efforts (Strausberg 1995). 
The National Turkey Federation represents growers and processors. It and its state-level 
affiliates have used state fairs, school visits, free recipe pamphlets, and the Internet to 
promote turkey TV dinners, summer turkey grilling, and winter soup recipes. In February 
2003, the Federation awarded the Subway franchise restaurant chain as the first recipient 
of its annual Turkey on the Menu (T.O.M.) award (Turkey Talk 2003). The award citation 
reads, “Throughout its history, Subway has leveraged the broad appeal of turkey, which 
has become a popular item year-round and is closely associated with the great taste of 
Subway sandwiches.” Clearly, the Federation believes that demand seasonality can be 
altered with effort. Whether animal production sectors over the years have made signifi-
cant, deliberate, and costly efforts to deseasonalize cost structures is not presently 
apparent. But the nature of economic incentives to improve sector performance by at-
tempting to reduce cost and or preference seasonality should be of interest to those 
concerned with food product development.
  
Endnotes 
1. Remember, the model assumes that all fixed capital used is used in processing. 
2. One should not confuse “region” with “regional system.” It may even become prof-
itable for a farm in a traditional production region to use a system developed in 
another region. This will be more likely to occur when a system does not rely heav-
ily on regional endowments. 
 
  
Appendix 
Proof of Result 6 
 
Consider case (3ii). An increase in the value of µ  from 0µ  to 0µ + ε , 0ε > , gener-
ates no change in surplus to N  if the case does not change from (3). Leaving a change to 
case (1) for later, consider a change so that case (2) occurs. If the case becomes (2i), then 
surplus to N  certainly falls. If the case becomes (2ii), then the change in surplus to N  is 
2 1 0 1 1 2 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) 0S N N S N N S S NC C Q C C Q C C Q− −µ − ε −ρ − −ρ − = − −µ − ε < , where case (2) 
conditions are used. 
Consider (3i). If the case becomes (2i) after an increase in the value of µ , then sur-
plus to N  does not change. Were the case to become (2ii), then surplus to N  would 
increase. Can the case become (2ii)? That is, can 1 1S NC C− ≤ ρ  and 2 1 0S NC C− > µ + ε +ρ ? 
Namely, can 1 1S NC C− ≤  2 1 0S NC Cρ < − −µ − ε ? No, because 1 2 0S SC C< −µ − ε  violates the 
conditions of case (2). Therefore, the increase in the value of µ  involves transition to 
case (2i) (or case (1), to be dealt with next). 
Consider case (2ii). Surplus to N  does not change whenever the case remains (2). If 
the case becomes (1i), then surplus to N  falls. If the case becomes (1ii), then the change 
in surplus to N  is 2 2 2 1 0 1 2 0( ) ( ) ( ) 0S N N S N N N N NC C Q C C Q C C Q−ρ − − − −µ −ρ = − +µ < , 
where case (2) conditions are used.  
Consider case (2i). If the case becomes (1i) after an increase in the value of µ , then 
surplus to N  is unaffected. Can the case become (1ii), so that surplus to N  would in-
crease? This requires 2 2S NC C− > ρ  and 2 1 0S NC C− ≤ µ +ρ , that is, 
2 1 0 2 2
S N S NC C C C− −µ ≤ ρ < − . This is not possible because 2 1 0N NC C− < µ  violates case (2) 
assumptions. Finally, when equilibrium is initially in either of cases (1i) or (1ii), then an 
increase in the value of µ  has no effect.  ■
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